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Misfeasance in Public Office.
Case Note: Three Rivers District Council and others v Bank ofEngland (No 3) [1996] 3 All ER 55
Howard Davis
An ultra vires action by a public official or authority does not, simply
of itself, give rise to an action for damages. In Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum
Co Ltd! the House of Lords resisted the development in the UK of a tort,
proposed in an Australian case, by which "a person who suffers harm or loss
as the inevitable consequence of the unlawful, intentional and positive acts
ofanother"2 should have a right to damages. The Australian case, Beaudesert
Shire Council v Smith3 has, in any case, now been overruled in Australia.4 An
action for damages in English law must be based on additional factors other
than simple unlawfulness. 5 One of these is that the requirements of the tort
of misfeasance in public office have been made out.
Though its existence is not doubted, misfeasance in public office is a
"developing tort...the precise scope of which is not yet settled".6 A major
landmark in its recent development was Bourgoin SA and others v Ministry
ofAgriculture, Fisheries and Food. 7 Here, for the purposes of a preliminary
ruling, the minister accepted that his revocation of an import licence was
done in the knowledge firstly, that it violated the directly effective rights of
the plaintiff under Article 30 of the Treaty ofRome, secondly that it would
harm the plaintiff and thirdly that the purpose behind the revocation was the
protection of domestic producers which was not a legitimate purpose under
[1981]2AllER456.
Ibid, 463.
(1996) 120 CLR 145.
Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 69 ALJR 527, High Court of Australia.
See, Arrowsmith S, Civil Liability and Public Authorities, Winteringham Earlsgate Press, 1992, pp 234 -
235, for a list of the grounds for an action for damages in respect ofunlawful administrative actions and
references to the body of the text.
De Smith & WoolfJudicial Review ofAdministrative Action, p 784.
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Community law. The minister argued, successfully, that the proper remedy
for breach of Article 30 was judicial review rather than damages8 and,
unsuccessfully, that these facts did not disclose the grounds for misfeasance
in public office since the minister had not acted with malice. Bourgoin SA
and others v Ministry ofAgriculture, Fisheries and Food 9 is authority for the
view that misfeasance in public office can be committed without having to
show that the official acted with the specific purpose ofinflicting harm on the
plaintiff The case identified a second limb to the tort. In the absence of
malice plaintiffs can recover damages if they can prove, first, that the public
official knew at the time that he or she had no legal power to do that which
was done, and, second, that he or she knew at the time that the act done
would cause damage to the plaintiff. Three Rivers District Council and others
v Bank ofEngland (No 3)10 continues the attempt to specify the scope of the
tort by addressing, in particular, the issue of what must be established
regarding the official's state ofmind in relation to the second limb. The case
is an action for damages brought by depositors with the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International against the Bank ofEngland on the grounds that the
latter had failed adequately to supervise BCCI's operations in the UK either
by wrongly granting or wrongly failing to revoke, a licence. The case is a
judgment on two preliminary issues: the scope ofmisfeasance in public office
and the impact of the 1977 Banking Directive (Council Directive EEC
77/780). This note is mainly concerned with the first issue.
To establish misfeasance in public office without having to show
malice, the plaintiff must establish, first, that the official knew that his or her
act was not authorised by law. The type of knowledge required is discussed
in Three Rivers District Council and others v Bank ofEngland (No 3).11 One
possibility considered l2 was that a form of constructive knowledge is
sufficient. The argument was that negligence as to whether the power existed
would be sufficient to establish that part of the tort; ie, that the requirement
But see now: Francovich v Italy Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 [1991] ECR 1-5357.
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of knowledge is satisfied if a reasonable official should have known there
was no lawful authority to act. Clarke J rejected this approach and the case,
therefore, gives no support to those who argue that an action for damages
should lie in respect of a possible "duty to take care to ensure that action is
intra vires". 13 Clarke's rejection of the argument that negligence is sufficient,
is based on a wide ranging review ofthe case law which, he held, supported
or was not inconsistent with his view that the "basis of the tort is abuse of
power" 14 and that "That involves at least some element ofdeliberate abuse or
dishonesty" .15 Throughout his discussion of the tort, Clarke J finds support
in the judgment of the High Court of Australia in Northern Territory v
Mengel 16 and it is clear in that case that establishing misfeasance involves
showing that there was a lack of an "honest attempt to perform the relevant
duty" .17 From that general perspective on the tort it follows, in Clarke J's
view, that, whilst negligence is not sufficient, recklessness by the official as
to the existence of a power to act does satisfy this part of the tort; it is not
necessary to prove actual knowledge of unlawfulness. In this context an
official is reckless if he or she suspects that what they are doing may be
unauthorised but they wilfully refuse to make reasonable inquiries about their
powers or choose to turn a blind eye despite their suspicions. 18
In the absence of malice it is, secondly, necessary to prove that the
official knew that his or her unlawful actions would cause damage to the
plaintiff. For the same reason as applied to the first issue of whether there
was lawful authority to act, Clarke J has decided that it is not necessary to
prove actual knowledge by the official of damage to the plaintiff and that
recklessness, in the sense identified above, is sufficient. Proof that damage
13
"
17
Arrowsmith S, op cit, p 178.
[1996] 3 All ER 578, d.
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(1995) 69 ALJR 527, Aust HC
[1996] 3 All ER 581,j.
[1996] 3 All ER 558, 579 - 582. For Clarke J either the concept of "knowledge" included not making
reasonable inquiries about suspicions or turning a blind eye, or it did not, in which case the liability in the
tort in the absence ofmalice could be based on recklessness (578,j.)
Cf, Arrowsmith S, op cit, p 228.
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to the plaintiff is only a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the unlawful
act is not, however, sufficient.!9 Clarke J has also held that the relevant object
of actual knowledge of, or recklessness as to damage, is that loss to the
plaintiff is probable rather than necessary or inevitable.20 It is also knowledge
of, or recklessness as to damage to a class of persons of which the plaintiff
is one, rather than knowledge ofdamage to the plaintiff in particular?! Clarke
J allows the tort to include knowledge of damage to a class rather than only
to the plaintiff in particular, because he considers the defendant authority,
given the stringent requirements of the tort, already has sufficient protection.
There is no compelling reason that officials, in the circumstances in which
the tort can be made out, should enjoy the additional, policy-based, protection
of not having to risk actions from an indeterminate group of possible
plaintiffs forming the membership of a class. Such protection may be
appropriate in actions based on negligence but not in relation to officials
knowingly acting outside their powers.22 It is also worth noting that actions
based on negligence may also be restricted in relation to the rules on
economic loss. Though the losses in Three Rivers District Council and others
v Bank ofEngland (No 3/3 are entirely economic there is no discussion by
Clarke J ofthe economic loss rules, thus illustrating that they have no bearing
on the tort and indicating further reasons for its attractiveness for plaintiffs
when compared with Negligence.24
One of the arguments canvassed before Clarke J was that in order to
succeed in the tort the plaintiff had to prove the infringement of an existing
legal right by the official's misfeasance. In other words the tort, it was argued,
should be confined to situations where the plaintiff can show an existing
private right which is infringed or where the state and its emanations already
owe a duty (there is no mention in the discussion of "legitimate
[1996] 3 All ER 558,578 e.
20 [1996]3 All ER 558,583 c - e.
21 Ibid.
22 [1996] 3 All ER 558,632, a-f.
2l [1996] 3 All ER 55
24 Arrowsmith S, op cil, P 228.
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expectations") to the plaintiff. For Clarke J such a limit to the tort is not
required by modem authority and he goes on to reject it in principle. The
essence of the tort is to provide a remedy in damages for those who suffer
losses, including economic losses, from the deliberate, but not merely
negligent, abuse of public power. There is no justification for imposing an
additional requirement ofproving pre-existing rights infringed or duties not
performed. Of course the existence of a pre-existing right or duty may be
highly relevant in relation to the identification of the class of persons to
whom the infliction ofprobable damage was known by the official. In Clarke
1's example, no damage is done to someone prevented from voting who has
no pre-existing right to vote.25 The knowledge that an official has of the
classes ofpersons who will probably be affected by his or her actions will be,
in fact, largely influenced by the official's knowledge ofthe rights and duties
III Issue.
In Three Rivers District Council and others v Bank ofEngland (No 3/6
Clarke J also gives preliminary rulings on whether plaintiffs may have
grounds for bringing an action for damages in respect of a breach of
European Community Law, namely the "1977 Banking Directive":- Council
Directive (EEC) 771780 on the "coordination of laws, regulations and
administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit ofthe business
of credit institutions". His general conclusion is that no such grounds exist.
The caselinvolves a long discussion ofthe issues involved. It is not, however,
the intention ofthis note to discuss these issues in detail. Clarke J interprets
the Banking Directive as having, as one of its purposes, the protection of
investors. However the directive does not impose on the relevant regulatory
bodies duties which are owed to individual investors. It is not intended that
the benefits of the directive are to be achieved by the creation of individual
rights. The purpose of benefiting investors and others can be achieved by
other means. His reasoning, that intending a benefit does not necessarily
create individual rights to the benefit, follows that of the Privy Council in
2l
26
[1996] 3 All ER 558,584. The obvious reference is to Ashby v White (1703) 92 ER 710,92 ER 126,
discussed by Clarke J [1996] 3 All ER 558, 585 h.
[1996]3 All ER 55
91
Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies
Yuen Kun-yeu V A-G ofHong Kong-7 and Davis v Radcliffe28, two cases
involved with interpretation of the Banking Acts 1979 and 1987. Although
these Acts were designed, in part, for the protection of investors, there was,
given the nature and context ofthe regulatory task, no intention to create for
investors individual rights against the regulator. In Clarke J's opinion, the
Privy Council's view should influence the proper interpretation of the 1977
Banking Directive, first because the Banking Acts were designed to put the
directive into effect and should, therefore, have been interpreted to achieve
the purposes of the directive (even in the context of cases not involving ED
members) and, secondly, because such a view is right in principle: the range
of matters that a banking regulator needs to take into account means that it
would be inappropriate for there to be investors' rights of protection
correlative to the regulator's duties. Since the 1977 Banking Directive is not
intended to lead to the creation of individual rights, a remedy in damages
under EC law is not available. The intended creation of individual rights is
a necessary condition for finding that a directive has direct effect or for
damages against the state under the principle in Francovich v Italy9 or under
the reasoning in Factortarne IIPo. All the parties were agreed that they did not
want, at first instance, an Article 177 reference to the European Court of
Justice.
It is clear from Clarke J's judgment that the development of
misfeasance in public office is unlikely to be the best way forward for
English law to provide the remedy in damages that is required by European
law. The criteria for establishing the tort and for establishing a right to
damages in respect of EC law are different. In particular, with the
requirement of knowledge (including recklessness) of unlawfulness and
probable loss, and with the rejection of negligence as to those matters as
sufficient to ground the tort, misfeasance is not flexible enough to meet the
"
28
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[1987] 2 All ER 705.
[1990] 2 All ER 536.
[1991] ECR 1-5357.
Brasserie du Pecheur SA v Germany, R v Secretary ofState for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd [1996]
QB 404.
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requirements ofEC law.31 In Clarke J's opinion it may be necessary for the
common law to develop a discrete remedy in damages for a breach of duty
or infringement of a right imposed by Community law.32
The essence of the tort of misfeasance in public office is the lack of
good faith by officials. However, in Three Rivers District Council and others
v Bank ofEngland (No 3),33 two different objects of "good faith" can be
discerned. One is good faith in relation to acting lawfully; ie, the official has
attempted to act within his or her power. The other is good faith in relation
to motive; ie, that the official has acted for a good motive such as a morally
reasonable conception ofthe public interest or to benefit a class ofpersons
it is morally reasonable for the official to benefit and not for a bad motive
such as self-interest. This second, motivational, sense of good faith does not
depend upon the lawfulness of the official's actions since there is no
necessary contradiction between acting for a good motive and acting
unlawfully. In the case, the extent to which an official has a good faith
defence available is unclear. If good faith in the first sense (relating to
lawfulness) is made out then obviously there can be no liability under the tort
since the official will not know that he or she is acting unlawfully. Clarke J
relies on good faith in the second, motivational, sense. He does so as part of
his argument that liability should be confmed to situations where the official
has actual knowledge of, or is reckless as to probable harm to, the plaintiff
and does not extend to the reasonable foreseeability of such harm. In his
view, a known unlawful act done in good faith in the second sense (ie, to
further an official's conception ofthe public good) should not attract liability
where harm to a class ofpersons is only reasonably foreseeable. 34 However,
where harm to a class of persons is known then, by the implication of
insisting that lack of good faith is the essence of the tort, there is no good
Although in one respect, whether it is necessary to establish a pre.existing right or duly, misfeasance in
public office is more flexible than is allowed under EC law.
12
J4
[1996] 3 All ER 558, 624 c· e.
[1996] 3 All ER 55
"...an officer may do something knowing it to be unlawful and in circumstances where it was reasonably
foreseeable that a class of persons might suffer loss, but he might nevertheless do it in the best interests
either of another class of persons or indeed of the plaintiff or of the class of persons of whom the plaintiff
is one. In my judgment such a person would not be acting in abuse of power, whereas it is abuse ofpower
that is the essence of the tort." [1996] 3 All ER 558,578 f· h.
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faith and damages may lie. 35 It is hard to see why lack of good faith is the
decisive point. An official's act done in the public interest but in the
knowledge that it is unlawful does not lose its good faith (in the second
sense) just because losses are foreseen and not just foreseeable. An official
could act in the second sense of good faith when the benefits of a policy
outweigh the burdens and that is true whether the burdens are foreseen or
merely foreseeable. This argument is less strong when the official is reckless
rather than knowing as to losses since, with recklessness, he or she is simply
refusing to consider losses and hence is not prepared to weigh them against
the benefits. That point amounts to an argument for confining the tort to
recklessness as to losses and there is no authority for so doing in Three Rivers
District Council and others v Bank ofEngland (No 3).36 It is submitted that
in so far as good faith is in issue in the tort it should be confined to the first
sense: that, irrespective of motive, there has not been an honest attempt to
exercise a lawful power. This view follows from the elimination of malice as
a necessary component of the tort. It is hard to understand why the official's
motive should be thought to be a sufficient explanation for the requirement
that losses need to have been foreseen. In the end, the tort is, perhaps, best
linked back to its public law context. The essence ofthe tort is that an official
has deliberately acted in the knowledge that what he or she has done is
unlawful. The restriction in terms of foreseen rather than just foreseeable loss
is then best explained by a policy of restricting the range of possible
plaintiffs.
Dr Howard Davis
Head ofAcademic Law
Southampton Institute
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